







Paul Mishkin was a colleague and a teacher to us, and we each esteem
him as a master craftsman of the law: learned, wise, and farsighted. To
reread his publications is to enter a world of clarity and integrity, in which
no word is wasted and insight is deep.
Early in his career Mishkin saw that the law could be apprehended
from two distinct and in part incompatible perspectives: from the internal
perspective of a faithful practitioner and from the external perspective of
the general public. If the social legitimacy of the law as a public institution
resides in the latter, the legal legitimacy of the law as a principled
unfolding of professional reason inheres in the former.' Mishkin came to
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t David Boies Professor of Law, Yale Law School. One of the irreparable losses of my recent
move to Yale has been the loss of the everyday companionship of Paul Mishkin.
tt Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke Law School. I am indebted to Paul
Mishkin for his profound teaching. When I would leave the Court to catch the last train home, I would
often look at the awesome building against the night sky and reflect on my experiences that day,
whether inspiring or disillusioning. During those times, I would think of Paul.
We are jointly grateful for the incisive comments of Bruce Ackerman, Jesse Choper, Richard Fallon,
Philip Frickey, Barry Friedman, Martin Golding, John Jeffries, Robert Mosteller, H. Jefferson Powell,
Jedediah Purdy, Christopher Schroeder, Reva Siegel, and the participants in this symposium.
I. See, for example, the distinction between "legal" and "sociological" legitimacy in Richard H.
Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1790-91 (2005) ("When legitimacy
functions as a legal concept, legitimacy and illegitimacy are gauged by legal norms. As measured by
sociological criteria, the Constitution or a claim of legal authority is legitimate insofar as it is accepted
(as a matter of fact) as deserving of respect or obedience--or, in a weaker usage ... , insofar as it is
otherwise acquiesced in."). See also Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1387 (2001) ("[T]he work of
constitutional judges must have both 'legal' and 'social' legitimacy. Social legitimacy, as distinguished
from legal legitimacy, looks beyond jurisprudential antecedents of constitutional decisions and asks
1473
HeinOnline -- 95 Cal. L. Rev. 1473 2007
CALIFORNIA LA W RE VIEW
believe that although the law required both forms of legitimacy, there was
nevertheless serious tension between them, and he dedicated his scholarly
career to attempting to theorize this persistent but necessary tension, which
he conceived almost as a form of antinomy.
In this article we pay tribute to Mishkin's quest for understanding. We
argue that the tension identified by Mishkin is significant and unavoidable,
but that it is also exaggerated. It presupposes an unduly stringent
separation between professional reason and popular values. In our view the
law/politics distinction is both real and suffused with ambiguity and
uncertainty. The existence of the law/politics distinction creates the
possibility of the rule of law, but the ragged and blurred boundaries of that
distinction vivify the law by infusing it with the commitments and ideals of
those whom the law purports to govern.
I
THE LEGITIMATION OF LAW: ELISIONS IN LEGAL PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE
Mishkin (b. 1927) came of age in the era of what we would now call
legal process jurisprudence, which was dominated by giants like Henry M.
Hart, Jr. (1905-1969) and Herbert Wechsler (1909-2000). As a young
professor, Mishkin taught from, and was influenced by, the manuscript
which would eventually become Hart and Wechsler's "masterful" 2 The
Federal Courts and the Federal System. In time Mishkin would become a
coauthor of the second and third editions of the book.
For Hart and Wechsler, "reason" was "the life of the law.",3 They
insisted that the Supreme Court should "be a voice of reason, charged with
the creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating and
developing impersonal and durable principles of constitutional law."
4
"[T]he main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be
genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in
reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the
immediate result that is achieved.",5 They regarded reason and principle as
distinguishing legal decision from mere "willfulness or will,"' 6 as
separating a court from a mere "naked power organ."
7
whether those decisions are widely understood to be the correct ones given the social and economic
milieu in which they are rendered." (footnote omitted)).
2. Paul J. Mishkin, Book Review, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 776, 776 (1954) (reviewing HENRY M.
HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953)).
3. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 125 (1959).
4. Id. at 99.
5. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15
(1959).
6. Id. at 11.
7. Id. at 12.
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Hart and Wechsler did not insist on reason and principle because they
would render courts more accountable, or because they were necessary to
ensure fairness to litigants. They believed instead that reason and principle
would endow law with legitimacy. If courts engaged in merely "ad hoc
evaluation," 8 deciding each case simply on the basis of its desired outcome
without reference to "reasons that in their generality and their neutrality
transcend any immediate result that is involved," 9 there would be no reason
for persons to submit to judicial authority whenever they lost a lawsuit.
Courts claim authority not because their decisions are agreeable-every
case has a losing party as well as a winning one-but because their
decisions are "asserted to have ... legal quality," which inheres in the
obligation "to be ... entirely principled." 10 It is thus not sufficient in
criticizing a court's decision to complain that it has reached a wrong
outcome; one must also assign "reasons that should have prevailed with the
tribunal."' ' In the view of Hart and Wechsler, "[o]nly opinions which are
grounded in reason," which possess "the underpinning of principle," can
"carry the weight which has to be carried by the opinions of a tribunal
which, after all, does not in the end have the power either in theory or in
practice to ram its own personal preferences down other people's
throats."' 2
In truth, Hart and Wechsler were not particularly clear about what
they meant by "reason" or "principle." They knew full well that reason and
principle were "inescapably 'political' . . . in that they involve a choice
among competing values or desires.' 13 And they were also aware that
neither reason nor principle could transform law into a set of "rules" whose
meaning could be fully and determinately specified in advance. Hart had in
fact written that much law must necessarily come in the form of
"standards" whose meaning could be known only at "the point of
8. Id.
9. Id. at 19.
10. Wechsler, supra note 5, at 19.
11. Id. at 11. Thus Henry Hart complained that
[m]any even of the professional critics of the Court's work seem to have little more to say, in
substance, than that they do not like some of the results and yearn for ipse dixits their way
instead of the Court's way. Meanwhile, the principal vocal accompaniment of the Court's
labors is provided by the shrill voices of even more shallow-minded lay commentators,
crying, "One up (or one down) for subversion," "One up (or one down) for civil liberties,"
"One up (or one down) for states' rights." But the time must come when it is understood
again, inside the profession as well as outside, that reason is the life of the law and not just
votes for your side. When that time comes, and the country gathers its resources for the
realization of this life principle, the principle will be more completely realized than it now
seems to be.
Hart, supra note 3, at 125.
12. Id. at 99.
13. Wechsler, supra note 5, at 15.
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application" in the context of a "particular situation."' 4 For Hart and
Wechsler, therefore, "reason" and "principle" entailed neither value
neutrality nor outcome determinativeness.
What, then, did their emphasis on "reason" and "principle" signify? It
seemed to suggest a fundamental commitment to a "type of reasoned
explanation that... is intrinsic to judicial action." 15 It meant a commitment
to act only in virtue of articulated reasons and to be bound by such
articulated reasons wherever applicable. But this thin commitment left
unanswered many hard questions. For example, what values should
articulated reasons embody? How abstractly or concretely should
principles be formulated? How is the appropriate scope of a principle's
application to be ascertained? The answers to these questions were
fundamental, yet in essence Hart and Wechsler simply remitted them to the
actual practice of the ongoing norms of the legal profession. In effect,
therefore, the affirmation of "principle" and "reason" in legal process
jurisprudence signified the importance of fidelity to the professional
practices that comprised "good lawyership.
1 6
There is a strange elision at the core of this account of law. It is
implausible to imagine that the authority of courts can be sustained in the
context of serious controversies merely because judges offer reasons or
principles for their decisions, even when they do so in ways that comply
with the best professional norms of practice. To understand how Hart and
Wechsler might have advanced such a position, we might conceive them as
making two distinct points. First, professional norms, including norms of
reason-giving, are essential to law; second, law, qua law, carries authority
and legitimacy.
The first point invokes the plausible idea that requiring judges to
articulate the principles that drive their decisions would contribute toward
the fulfillment of a major function of law, which is to provide "a
justification in principle for official coercion."' 17 Treating reasons as
authoritative would discipline courts to decide future cases according to
articulated reasons, and it would also provide reliable guidance to the
public about the future path of the law. "Only opinions which are grounded
in reason and not on mere fiat or precedent can do the job which the
Supreme Court of the United States has to do. Only opinions of this kind
can be worked with by other men who have to take a judgment rendered on
one set of facts and decide how it should be applied to a cognate but still
14. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 140 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). Hart
and Sachs discuss the distinction between rules and standards at 139-41.
15. Wechsler, supra note 5, at 15-16.
16. Hart, supra note 3, at 100.
17. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 110 (1986).
[Vol. 95:14731476
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different set of facts. 18 Hart and Wechsler's celebration of reason and
principle, understood in the context of an affirmation of professional norms
of practice, would thus seem intimately connected to achieving the goods
of consistency, stability, predictability, and transparency that are essential
to the rule of law.'
9
Hart and Wechsler's second point seems largely unexamined. All
would no doubt agree that the rule of law is of enormous social value. But
there are other important social ideals, and these ideals can sometimes
conflict with the value of legality.2 ° Such conflicts are in fact endemic to
moments of high controversy. When rule-of-law values conflict with other
important social goods, it may be inaccurate to assume that judicial
decision making gains authority merely by remaining faithful to rule-of-
law virtues. Adherence to Lochner precedents of substantive due process
may well have been consistent with the rule of law, and in sustaining
Lochner-type norms of substantive due process the Court may have been
keeping faith with established norms of professional practice, including
norms of reason-giving. But such fidelity in no way contributed to the
authority of the Court during the crisis of the New Deal, and in fact it
likely undermined the legitimacy of the Court.2
Neither Hart nor Wechsler, however, theorized situations of this kind.
They emphasized instead "the professional respect of first-rate lawyers for
the incumbent Justices of the Court,, 22 implying that the craft of "good
lawyership ' '23 was freestanding and self-validating. Professional reason
appeared in their work as an unquestioned source of authority and
legitimacy.
18. Hart, supra note 3, at 99.
19. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at
the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 2015-16 (2005); Robert C. Post, Theories of
Constitutional Interpretation, in CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 30-32 (1995).
20. Post, supra note 19, at 40-41; Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW 228 (1979) ("Since the rule of law is just one of the virtues the law should
possess, it is to be expected that it possesses no more than prima facie force. It has always to be
balanced against competing claims of other values."); id. at 229 (noting that "the rule of law is meant to
enable the law to promote social good" and cautioning that "[s]acrificing too many social goals on the
altar of the rule of law may make the law barren and empty"); Martin Krygier, Marxism and the Rule of
Law: Reflections after the Collapse of Communism, 15 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 633, 645 (1990) ("There is
also room for argument that the rule of law is not all we should want and for recognition that, in case of
conflict of values, we need not assume that only maintenance of the rule of law matters, or that any
chink in what are fancied to be its formalistic preconditions spells its doom." (footnote omitted)).
21. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1387 ("The proper lesson of Lochner instructs us that, even
where it is possible to identify a jurisprudential basis for judicial decisions, if those familiar with the
Court's decisions do not believe those decisions to be socially correct, the work of judges will be seen
as illegitimate. There will be attacks on judges and, ultimately, on the institution of judicial review.
Even in the face of established precedent, law itself will come to be seen as nothing but politics.").
22. Hart, supra note 3, at 101.
23. Id. at 100.
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II
THE GAP BETWEEN PROFESSIONAL REASON AND POPULAR LEGITIMATION
Mishkin deeply internalized the focus of legal process jurisprudence
,,24on "analytical considerations. He prized the integrity of professional
craft and rigor. He dedicated his first book to the proposition that although
"Legal Realism's major battle has been won, 25 it must also be affirmed
"that judicial action functions within limits of both power and propriety-
limits that are rarely narrow or rigid, but important limits nonetheless.
These bounds are found in the judicial institution and its processes, in the
conception of the judge's task and how it is properly done. 26 In an early
article he insisted that "professional commentators on the Court's work
should begin to focus more on the objective resolution and analysis of the
issues before the court and less on the personalities or politics." Mishkin
hoped that this change of focus would break the "self-fulfilling prophecy"
of a crude legal realism "that decisions of Supreme Court Justices are
always wholly matters of personal politics and predilection. 27  Three
decades later, he was still affirming that "[i]n theory, at least, the Court-
as distinguished from other agencies of government-must rest its decision
on an analytically sound principle. 28
24. Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 833 (1957).
25. PAUL J. MISHKIN & CLARENCE MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF CASE AND STATUTE LAW, at v (1965) ("Nowadays only the most
professional naive believe that courts mechanically apply prefixed law to simon-pure facts.").
26. Id. Mishkin believed that "unfortunately,"
the lesson taught by the realists is sometimes over-leamed. The recognition of judges'
humanness and the rejection of mechanical theories of the judicial process is then seen as
implying that judicial choices range entirely free and that courts are seldom, if ever,
hampered in doing just precisely as they wish. Moreover, this view is often coupled with the
implicit assumption that this is as things must be-that there can be no effective limits on the
power of judges....
We think these latter inferences wrong.
Id. See id. at 39 ("Understanding, training and tradition combine to enforce judicial allegiance to the
principles, doctrines and precedents which constitute the official inheritance. As Professor Llewellyn
has put it, judges feel a duty to both justice and the law."); Id. at 40 ("Judges are, on the whole, decent
and honorable men who seek to live up to their conceptions of the proper role of the
judge.... Moreover, their ideas of what the proper role of a judge is--of what the obligations of the
position are-are substantially shaped by their own professional training and experience, and by the
expectations and conceptions of the legal profession."); Id. at 191 ("The ordinary judicial decision is
closely related to an existing body of doctrines and precedents bearing on the issue before the court.
The court has an obligation to line up these ordinary decisions with those authorities. This is the
obligation of consistency. Some significant options are open to courts deciding routine cases, but the
range within which there is this freedom of choice is usually ... limited ... ").
27. Paul J. Mishkin, Prophecy, Realism and the Supreme Court: The Development of
Institutional Unity, 40 A.B.A. J. 680, 682-83 (August 1954).
28. Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the
Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 930 (1983). By "principle," Mishkin
meant opinion writing that meets basic "demands of generality and fidelity-requiring sincere efforts to
reason in terms of precepts that transcend the individual case and that are conscientiously seen as
governing in all cases within their stated terms." Id. at 909. Principle "transcends the particular case, is
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But Mishkin also perceived the elision at the heart of legal process
jurisprudence. While he wholeheartedly affirmed the importance of rule-
of-law virtues, he recognized that professional reason was not
unambiguously self-validating. It is striking that Mishkin and his almost
exact contemporary Alexander Bickel (1924-1974) were each drawn to
study "the intersection of principle and politics," to theorize those
situations where "the demands of a wise or politic result may be in tension
with the dictates of principle. '2 9 Although each believed in the value of
professional craft, each also sought to understand circumstances in which,
paradoxically, the single-minded pursuit of professional craft could
undermine the authority of the Court.30
In his profound analysis of United States v. Nixon, 31 for example,
Mishkin flayed the Court on the ground that "its major pronouncements are
essentially ex cathedra, its analysis of the major issues simplistic, and its
doctrines supported far more by the fiat of the Justices' commissions than
by the weight of either learning or reasoning. 32 In the context both of
President Nixon's assertion that no Executive Branch official could invoke
compulsory judicial process against him and of the ultimate issue of
executive privilege, Mishkin traced a repeated pattern in the Court's
opinion "of a gratuitous non-consequence-bearing declaration favoring a
position taken by the President, followed by a somewhat off-the-mark
rationale supporting a holding squarely against him., 33 So, for example, the
Court unnecessarily asserted that "the Executive Branch has exclusive
authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case, 34
even though the special prosecutor in the case "was undoubtedly in the
rationally defensible in those general terms, and is analytically adequate to support the result." Id. at
929. Mishkin distinguished his conception of principle from Wechsler's "neutral principles" thesis. See
id. at 908-909 (citing Wechsler, supra note 5).
29. Id. at 907.
30. Alexander Bickel put the point this way:
But Mr. Wechsler, I believe, is not right.
No society, certainly not a large and heterogeneous one, can fail in time to explode if it
is deprived of the arts of compromise, if it knows no ways of muddling through. No good
society can be unprincipled; and no viable society can be principle-ridden. But it is not true in
our society that we are generally governed wholly by principle in some matters and indulge a
rule of expediency exclusively in others. There is no such neat dividing line.... Most
often,... and as often as not in matters of the widest and deepest concern, such as the racial
problem, both requirements exist most imperatively side by side: guiding principle and
expedient compromise. The role of principle, when it cannot be the immutable governing
rule, is to affect the tendency of policies of expediency. And it is a potent role.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 64 (1962).
31. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
32. Paul J. Mishkin, Great Cases and Soft Law: A Comment on United States v. Nixon, 22
UCLA L. REV. 76, 76 (1974).
33. Id. at 83.
34. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 693.
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Executive Branch, 35 and "[t]he issue had been-and remains-a very live
and important one in the context of whether Congress can establish an
independent special prosecutor appointed and removable by judges. 3 6 The
Court nevertheless flatly rejected the President's contention that no
Executive Branch official could invoke judicial process against him,
ignoring "the line of authority [and] history (represented, e.g., by Myers v.
United States) which asserts with great strength the inherent power of the
President to control and to remove subordinate policy-level officials in the
Executive Branch despite even congressional legislation seeking to limit
it."
3 7
The peculiar pattern in the Court's opinion, Mishkin explained, was
due to the fact that the case involved "the great public issue" of "whether
the President was above or under the law,, 38 and that the Court, in
confronting the President, had primarily "to take into account the Court's
own institutional position" in order to conserve its "stature, prestige, and
future effectiveness. 39 Mishkin argued that the analytical failures of the
Nixon opinion were caused by the Court's desire to avert the twin dangers
that the President "might defy the Court's order" and that "the Court might
become the focus of animus or partisan attack by the President's
supporters., 40 Mishkin recognized that fidelity to principle was in tension
35. Mishkin, supra note 32, at 81.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 82-83 (footnote omitted) (referencing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
Mishkin saw the same pattern "in the Court's handling of the ultimate issue of executive privilege." Id.
at 83. In "firmly pronounc[ing] not only the existence of a presidential executive privilege based on a
general need for confidentiality, but explicitly that it rests on a constitutional base," the Court used only
"generalized a priori reasoning" and ignored "[t]he substantial body of scholarly learning on the
subject, which includes careful historical and analytical treatments." Id. at 83-84. The Court's
declaration that the privilege was of constitutional (as opposed to common law) moment "carried no
real consequences in the case," for the Court then held that the privilege "must nevertheless yield to the
need for complete evidence in criminal prosecutions." Id. at 84. The Court was unconcerned with "the
nature of the criminal prosecution," even though the special prosecutor "had strongly urged" the
narrower limitation "that the privilege would be overcome only on a showing that there was substantial
basis for belief that the participants in the conversation were probably involved in criminal activities."
Mishkin, supra note 32, at 84. Although "one expects the Supreme Court to resolve a difficult issue,
and particularly one with constitutional dimensions, on the narrowest available grounds," the Nixon
Court "certainly" did not choose that "route." Id. at 85.
38. Id. at 86.
39. Id.
40. Id. To meet the first danger, the Court had to "close ranks" around a "single opinion," which
empowered any Justice to "demand, as the price of his not writing separately, the inclusion (or
exclusion) ... of any language or ideas to which he assigns sufficient importance." Id. at 87. The
second danger "could not be totally avoided," but "it would certainly be exacerbated by any language
or position which made reference to the possible personal involvement of the President; it might be
minimized by scrupulous maintenance of an apparently totally neutral stance-not only with regard to
the facts but in the selection of abstract and highly generalized principles as the rationale of any adverse
holding." Mishkin, supra note 32, at 88. Mishkin accounted for "the gratuitous, overbroad statements in
favor of presidential positions" in terms of "[t]he negotiated nature of the unanimous opinion" and
"[t]he drive to present a totally neutral appearance." Id. at 88. "But the principal impact of the need for
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with the competing value of the Court's own institutional legitimacy, and
he was prepared to conclude:
If the price of preservation of the Court's effectiveness and prestige
is the handing down of such unsatisfactory opinions, then even an
institution whose authority is premised upon adherence to principle
and to reason may be forgiven in seeing such defective opinion-
writing as a reasonable cost to pay. The misleading nature of what
is written can be corrected by the Court later, and with relative
ease. Damage to the Court's stature, prestige, or credibility is not
so easily repaired.4'
In Mishkin's view, a pure exercise of professional reason would have
been insufficient to endow the Court's opinion with authority in United
States v. Nixon. Hart and Wechsler neither conceived nor theorized the
possibility of this tension between principle and legitimacy. At the root of
the tension is the fact that rule-of-law virtues can unambiguously establish
authority only within a community that is primarily dedicated to the rule of
the law, which is to say within a community of legal professionals. But the
legitimacy of courts does not depend merely upon this community, but
instead most directly upon the polity in its widest political sense. Mishkin
understood the importance of maintaining "that public confidence which is
the ultimate foundation of the Court's authority., 42 Throughout his career
Mishkin would remain exquisitely attuned to public perceptions of the
Court. It was characteristic for him to identify the contradiction within the
Nixon decision as flowing from the fact that it was "addressed almost
entirely to the present and to the current American public," but that it failed
to "speak with anything like the same strength to the law and the future. 43
Over and over again, Mishkin would demonstrate the difficulties
accruing to constitutional adjudication because of the fundamental
disparity between professional and popular beliefs. This disparity was not
easily mediated. Although Mishkin approved "the wisdom and propriety of
the Court's" opting to preserve its institutional legitimacy over its fidelity
to rule-of-law virtues, he nevertheless acknowledged that the choice posed
"a most difficult and fundamental problem." 44 He was "sufficiently
conscious of the dangers of simply concluding that short term success is its
a starkly neutral stance appears in the selection of the rationales asserted in support of the holdings
against Mr. Nixon." Id. By operating at a high level of abstraction and focusing "on the simple
pendency of a criminal prosecution," the Court avoided "the slightest reference or allusion to possible
implication of the President himself." Id. at 89.
41. Id. at 90. Mishkin did not explain why he considered it of paramount importance to preserve
the "effectiveness and prestige" of the Court.
42. Mishkin, supra note 27, at 683.
43. Mishkin, supra note 32, at 76. It should be noted in this regard that Karl Llewellyn was a
major influence on Mishkin during his law student days at Columbia. See, e.g., supra note 26 (noting
Mishkin's invocation of Llewellyn).
44. Mishkin, supra note 32, at 91.
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own proof of right to know that I hold this position only with tentativeness
and subject to reexamination with greater perspective. 4 5 What he regarded
as a fierce, indissoluble tension between the demands of professional craft
and the requirements of public legitimacy led him to a brooding
uncertainty.
III
CONFRONTING THE GAP: HABEAS CORPUS AND AN EARLY SUCCESS
Mishkin recognized the structure of the problem early in his career,
when he identified the weakness in the easy confidence with which Hart
and Wechsler assumed that professional reason could be self-legitimating.
This was the theme of his remarkable 1965 Foreword to the Harvard Law
Review,46 in which he discussed the Court's assertion in Linkletter v.
Walker4' that it possessed a "general power.., to decide 'in each case'
whether a rule should be given retroactive effect.
4 8
Mishkin attacked Linkletter for breaking sharply with the "declaratory
theory" of the common law associated with Blackstone, which holds that
"courts simply 'find' or declare a preexisting law and do not exercise any
creative function., 49  "Prospective lawmaking," Mishkin argued, is
associated with the creation of new law and hence "is generally equated
with legislation. ,50 To claim the power to engage in "[p]rospective
limitation of judicial decisions"'5' is to endanger "the strongly held and
deeply felt belief that judges are bound by a body of fixed, overriding law,
that they apply that law impersonally as well as impartially, that they
exercise no individual choice and have no program of their own to
advance.,52 The stakes were high because the "declaratory theory" at the
45. Id.
46. Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term-Foreword. The High Court, the Great
Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965).
47. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
48. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 58 (footnote omitted).
49. Id. at 59.
50. Id. at 65.
51. Id. at 64.
52. Id. at 62. Justice Scalia has in recent years attacked prospective lawmaking in quite similar
terms-indeed even by citing Mishkin's Foreword:
That original and enduring American perception of the judicial role sprang not from the
philosophy of Nietzsche but from the jurisprudence of Blackstone, which viewed retroactivity
as an inherent characteristic of the judicial power, a power "not delegated to pronounce a new
law, but to maintain and expound the old one." I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69
(1765). Even when a "former determination is most evidently contrary to reason ... [or]
contrary to the divine law," a judge overruling that decision would "not pretend to make a
new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation." Id. at 69-70. "For if it be
found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a
sentence was bad law, but that it was not law. " Id. at 70 (emphasis in original). Fully
retroactive decisionmaking was considered a principal distinction between the judicial and
the legislative power: "[lt is said that that which distinguishes a judicial from a legislative
act is, that the one is a determination of what the existing law is in relation to some existing
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root of "the Blackstonian concept of court law" expressed "a symbolic
concept of the judicial process on which much of the courts' prestige and
power depend., 53 This "symbolic view of courts" is "a major factor in
securing respect for, and obedience to, judicial decisions, '54 bolstering
"faith in, and commitment to, a regime of 'law and order."' 55 "[T]he
establishment and application of a power of prospective limitation
produces sharp and recurrent conflict with the symbolic ideal reflected in
the Blackstonian concept and with the emotional loyalties it commands. 56
Mishkin did not believe, however, that the Blackstonian concept of
law was entirely true. He was of course aware that "[t]he insights of 'legal
realism,"' which were "increasingly pervasive," were inconsistent with that
concept of law. Although he sometimes objected to the
"oversimplification" of some applications of legal realism, he conceded
that "the approach has a core of soundness" '57 (while nevertheless
lamenting the "corrosive effect" of legal realism upon the Blackstonian
concept of courts).58 And of course Mishkin also knew full well that all
thing already done or happened, while the other is a predetermination of what the law shall be
for the regulation of all future cases." T. COOLEY CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS *91 ....
Prospective decisionmaking was known to foe and friend alike as a practical tool of
judicial activism, born out of disregard for stare decisis. In the eyes of its enemies, the
doctrine "smack[ed] of the legislative process," Mishkin, 79 HARV. L. REV., at 65 ....
Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 107-108 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also id. at
103 (citing, inter alia, Mishkin, supra note 46, at 58-72, in noting that "commentary, of course,
has.., regarded the issue of retroactivity as a general problem of jurisprudence").
53. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 62.
54. ld.
55. Id. at 64.
56. Id. at 66. See id. at 69 ("[T]he assertion of a general power of prospective limitation
.... will tend to generate more frequent arguments for the exercise of such power and the necessity to
respond thereto, with concomitant spotlighting of the fact of change and strong overtones of legislative
rather than judicial process."). See also Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment):
[P]rospective decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say what the
law is, not to prescribe what it shall be. The very framing of the issue that we purport to
decide today-whether our decision in Scheiner shall "apply" retroactively-presupposes a
view of our decisions as creating the law, as opposed to declaring what the law already is.
Such a view is contrary to that understanding of "the judicial Power," U.S. Const., Art. Ill, §
1, which is not only the common and traditional one, but which is the only one that can
justify courts in denying force and effect to the unconstitutional enactments of duly elected
legislatures, see Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137 (1803)-the very exercise of judicial
power asserted in Scheiner. To hold a governmental Act to be unconstitutional is not to
announce that we forbid it, but that the Constitution forbids it; and when, as in this case, the
constitutionality of a state statute is placed in issue, the question is not whether some decision
of ours "applies" in the way that a law applies; the question is whether the Constitution, as
interpreted in that decision, invalidates the statute. Since the Constitution does not change
from year to year; since it does not conform to our decisions, but our decisions are supposed
to conform to it; the notion that our interpretation of the Constitution in a particular decision
could take prospective form does not make sense.
Id. at 201.
57. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 68.
58. ld. at 68.
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law, including judge-made law, "must in fact change, 59 and that it would
be stultifying and undesirable if judges merely applied pre-existing law.
The image of transparent and passive courts that were mere mouthpieces of
preexisting law was in significant respects sheer fantasy.60
Mishkin thus understood law to straddle an essential contradiction
between the truth of its own application and the preconditions of its public
legitimation. Boldly seizing this contradiction, Mishkin insisted that if the
Blackstonian concept was "in part myth, it is a myth by which we live and
which can be sacrificed only at substantial cost."'6 1 The Blacksonian
concept, after all, sustained the legitimacy of the legal system itself. Were
that concept to be weakened, so also would the effectiveness and prestige
of courts. But this meant that the legitimacy of adjudication, and of the
craft that made adjudication possible, depended upon myths circulating in a
realm of popular "symbols" that "constitute an important element in any
societal structure.,
62
For Mishkin, therefore, "symbolism provides substantial emotional
support for basic truths important to proper functioning of the legal
system., 63 Myth and symbolism are necessary for the maintenance of the
"rule of law" itself.64 So long as the "ultimate foundation of the Court's
power" lay in its "public support, 65 that support would not come from
fidelity to professional reason, but rather from a cultural world of symbols
59. Id. at 66. See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment):
"[T]he judicial Power of the United States" conferred upon this Court and such inferior courts
as Congress may establish, Art. Ill, § 1, must be deemed to be the judicial power as
understood by our common-law tradition. That is the power "to say what the law is,"
Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), not the power to change it. I am
not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense
"make" law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as though they were
"finding" it-discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or
what it will tomorrow be. Of course this mode of action poses "difficulties of a ... practical
sort," ante, at 536, when courts decide to overrule prior precedent. But those difficulties are
one of the understood checks upon judicial law-making; to eliminate them is to render courts
substantially more free to "make new law," and thus to alter in a fundamental way the
assigned balance of responsibility and power among the three branches.
Id. at 549. We thank Phil Frickey for the references to Justice Scalia's opinions here and supra in notes
52 and 56.
60. See also, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 30, at 74 ("Judges and lawyers recurrently come to feel
that they find law rather than make it. Many otherwise painful problems seem to solve themselves with
ease when this feeling envelops people.").
61. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 63. "[C]onsider, for example, the loss involved ifjudges could
not appeal to the idea that it is 'the law' or 'the Constitution'-and not they personally-who command
a given result." Id.
62. Id. at 62.
63. Id. at 63.
64. Mishkin regarded "the Blackstonian concept" as "an important source of the moral force
that gives substance not only to the felt obligation to obey, but to other pervasive attitudes toward the
Court that are essential to the Court's effective operation." Id. at 67. Mishkin provides a full discussion
of this point in MISHKIN & MORRIS, supra note 25, at 80-81.
65. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 67.
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and myths that aroused emotions of loyalty and allegiance. Mishkin
believed that "the general habits of reliance on the law and obedience to
judicial decision" depended "only in small part" on "ratiocination":
Much more strongly operative are the symbolic values attached to
courts and the law. Herein lies the emotional strength which is the
real foundation of the "habit" of obedience-in the symbol of the
law as a fixed, certain body of authoritative rules which courts
mechanically (and thus impartially) "apply" or "find." The symbol
of a "government of laws and not of men" is a potent force in
society.
66
The undoubted success of Mishkin's Foreword lay in its ability to
deploy professional reason to fashion legal rules that would reinforce the
symbolism necessary to maintain the rule of law. By drawing important
distinctions between appellate review and collateral review, Mishkin
sought to create a principled structure of decision making that would give
the Court the necessary freedom to adjudicate prospectively and yet that
would not seem to endow the Court with symbolic power to engage in
prospective lawmaking. He proposed an analytic framework for defining
the scope of collateral habeas review that would enormously influence the
future development of the doctrine67 and that would liberate the Court to
develop constitutional principles of criminal procedure in ways that would
have only prospective effect. The task, as Mishkin defined it, was to use
professional reason to construct principles that would "reinforce-or at
least not.., weaken further-the general conception of the Court as a
court," and that would "strengthen rather than.., undermine the symbols
that help it to gain and maintain the support on which it depends:" 68
Mishkin's Foreword successfully deployed professional reason in
order to refashion the law in ways that would fortify the social
preconditions of the rule of law. But underlying this success lay dangerous
conceptual instabilities. Mishkin associated popular beliefs with an
emotional regime of symbols that could be reconciled with actual legal
principles only through careful manipulation and management. 69 The social
66. MISHKIN & MORRIS, supra note 25, at 8 1.
67. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989). See Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional
Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922, 975-76, 986-87 (2006); A. Christopher Bryant,
Retroactive Application of "'New Rules" and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 34 n.204 (2002); Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a
Retroactivit Alternative to Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 203, 236-38 (1998); Kermit Roosevelt Ill, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous
Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1123 (1999); Casenote,
Rethinking Retroactivity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1642, 1646-47 (2005).
68. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 69.
69. In response to the objection that "attempts to preserve" the symbolic view of law "involve
elements of deception," Mishkin wrote:
I hold no brief for obscuring truth from any one who wishes to learn and who will "take the
trouble to understand." At the same time, I see no affirmative virtue in the destruction of
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symbols evoked in the Foreword seemed immune from rational
persuasion; they were susceptible to influence, if at all, only by the dumb
weight of inarticulate experience, by what Mishkin, quoting Felix Cohen,
characterized as "the normative power of the actual.,,70 By manipulating
the inarticulate experience of actual practices, the legal system could
reinforce or undermine the social symbols upon which the legitimacy of
the rule of law rested.7'
Mishkin believed that only symbols possessed the power to sustain
essential shared political values, like the rule of law. A society could
change only if its symbols could evolve. In the Foreword, and for his entire
career as a scholar and a teacher, Mishkin was thus powerfully drawn to
Alfred North Whitehead's observation that
[t]he art of free society consists first in the maintenance of the
symbolic code; and secondly in fearlessness of revision, to secure
that the code serves those purpose which satisfy an enlightened
reason. Those societies which cannot combine reverence to their
symbols with freedom of revision, must ultimately decay either
from anarchy, or from the slow atrophy of a life stifled by useless
shadows.v2
In truth, however, Mishkin offered little or no account of how
"enlightened reason" could alter the symbol of the "Blackstonian concept."
Instead Mishkin's concern was to protect the strength of that symbol by
structuring law so as to reduce the "appearance" that the law was in
conflict with it.73 Mishkin essentially conceived symbols as receptive to the
shock of experience but not to the force of rational persuasion. For
Mishkin, therefore, a deep and impassible divide separated the principled
analytics of professional reason from the emotional and experiential logic
essentially sound and valuable symbols in order to promulgate a part of a more
sophisticated-and indeed over-all more accurate-general view. Such partial truths do not
necessarily represent a gain in wisdom over the more elementary general view, and the
destruction of the symbol does involve real loss.
Id. at 63 n.29.
70. Id. at 71. As Mishkin put it, "that which is law tends by its very existence to generate a
sense of being also that which ought to be the law." Id. See also Mishkin, supra note 27, at 681 n.6
("To be sure, an individual is frequently enough influenced... by an idea of what his job ought to be.
But that, in turn, is most often molded in large part by his impression of what the position in fact is.").
For a use of this insight in teaching constitutional law that is indebted to Mishkin's own teaching, see
Neil S. Siegel, Some Modest Uses of Transnational Legal Perspectives in First-Year Constitutional
Law, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 201 (2006).
71. In MISHKIN & MORRIS, supra note 25, at 79-87, Mishkin applied virtually the same analysis
to the question of stare decisis. Mishkin stressed the importance of preserving "an appearance of
continuity in doctrine." Id. at 87. Mishkin noted that the importance of this appearance was as
significant "for members of the legal profession" as for the general public. Id.
72. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 62 n.26 (quoting ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD: SYMBOLISM: ITS
MEANING AND EFFECT (1927)). See MISHKIN & MORRIS, supra note 25, at iii, 81-84.
73. See supra note 71.
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of symbols, upon which the authority and legitimacy of the Court
necessarily depended.
The fierce dilemma uncovered by Mishkin in his article analyzing the
Nixon decision is thus already implicit in his Foreword, written nine years
before. In his discussion of Nixon, Mishkin conceived the Court as having
to choose between following the dictates of professional reason and
following the symbolic logic of legitimacy. Although Mishkin's Foreword
had deftly solved this dilemma by postulating ways that professional
reason could be drafted into the service of symbolic logic, Nixon illustrated
that there were important circumstances where no such ingenious solution
was available. In Nixon, the Court was put to a tragic choice between the
substance of law and the appearance of law, between the logic of
professional reason and the emotional logic of symbolism. The only
possible option was to choose in a manner designed to minimize the
overall damage, a choice that plainly left Mishkin deflated and unsatisfied
at the end of his article.
There are elements in the Foreword that point in a quite different
direction. In one passage Mishkin observed that part of the truth in the
Blackstonian concept was that courts articulated "particular clear
implications of values so generally shared in the society that the process
might well be characterized as declaring a preexisting law. 74 He also
argued that principles of judicial decision-making ought to be formulated
so as to moderate "the possibility that judge-made law may move too far
away from community-held values. 75 In these observations Mishkin did
not postulate a logical opposition between reason and symbols, but instead
seemed to imagine a dialectic between professional reason and popular
beliefs, a dialectic that could sustain the legitimation of legal institutions.
Alexander Bickel dedicated his career to exploring the possible
structures of such a dialectical interaction between professional reason and
76popular values. But the cost of this approach was to loosen the autonomy
of professional reason by assimilating it to frankly political elements like
statesmanship and expediency.77 Mishkin refused to pay this price. He
74. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 60 (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 72.
76. See generally BICKEL, supra note 30; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 91 (1970); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).
77. This was the tack taken by Bickel primarily in his later work, in THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 76, and in THE MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 76. In Bickel's
earlier work, like THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 30, he advocated that the Court deploy
"the passive virtues," such as standing doctrine, in order to protect legal principles from being warped
by the need to maintain public legitimation. In an early article Mishkin himself anticipated and
advocated this use of the passive virtues. See Mishkin, supra note 27. For a recent example of
scholarship stressing the Court's use of avoidance techniques to preserve principle during a period of
anti-Communist hysteria, see Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance
Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 397, 401-402 (2005).
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insisted on maintaining the highest professional standards of craft, with the
consequence that his imagination persistently gravitated toward an
ineluctable tension between professional reason and popular myth. When,
fifteen years after his Foreword, he sought to understand the Court's
attempt to conceive and remedy sex discrimination, he viewed the Court's
decisions as "efforts to eradicate not only real sexual inequality but
symbolic stereotypes as well., 78 Mishkin of course added that it "is not
only inevitable but necessary and proper" for the Court to exercise this
kind of "political sensitivity," in part to maintain "the Court's legitimacy
and capacity to make ... choices for society.
79
The implicit opposition between reality and appearance, between
reason and symbolism, lay at the root of Mishkin's very conceptualization
of the problem. He would recur time and again to the dilemma he had
uncovered in the Nixon decision: How ought the Court act when fidelity to
the norms of professional reason essential to its "proper" 80 functioning
would undermine the conditions of its own legitimation?
IV
BELEAGUERED BY THE GAP:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND A HEARTFELT CRidu COEUR
Mishkin's unblinking appreciation of the potential antinomy between
professional and popular beliefs led him to remarkable insights about the
nature of American judicial practice. This was nowhere more sublimely
illustrated than in his discussion of Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke, 81 the decision in which the Supreme Court first established
constitutional standards for affirmative action in higher education. The case
involved a challenge to the affirmative action program of the medical
school of the University of California, Davis. The program explicitly set
aside sixteen places for minority students out of a class of one hundred.82
Mishkin had drafted the primary brief for the University, arguing that even
though the University used race as a criterion of admission, "the standard
of strict judicial scrutiny" did not apply 83 in the context of efforts to
"counteract [the] effects of generations of pervasive discrimination against
78. Paul J. Mishkin, Equality, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 62 (Summer 1980). "Though
this may appear to stress form over substance, the form in this instance is not trivial." Id. at 61.
79. Id. at 63-64. As with the issue of self-legitimation, see supra note 41, Mishkin did not
explain why the Court should make fundamental value choices for American society. Instead, he
seemed to accept as given that it is the "function of the Court" to be "arbiter of our nation's most
significant disputes." Mishkin, supra note 27, at 680.
80. MISHKIN & MORRIS, supra note 25, at v.
81. 438 U.S.265 (1978).
82. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 279 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
83. Brief for Petitioner, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76- 811)
[hereinafter University of California Brief in Bakke], 1977 WL 189474, at * 12.
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discrete and insular minorities. 84 The Supreme Court fractured three ways,
with the dispositive opinion authored by Justice Powell for himself alone.
Powell rejected Mishkin's argument that racial classifications in the
context of affirmative action should be immune from strict scrutiny. He
concluded that "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently
suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination." 85 He also
declined Mishkin's invitation to justify affirmative action in higher
education in terms of the remedial logic of past discrimination.86 Powell
instead offered a unique and highly innovative rationale that turned on the
"academic freedom" of universities to choose a student body that would
ensure "'wide exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as
this Nation of many peoples," so that universities could fulfill their
"mission" of selecting "those students who will contribute the most to the
'robust exchange of ideas.' ' 87 He conceptualized diversity as serving a
compelling educational interest.
84. Id. at *2.
85. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (opinion of Powell, J.).
86. The first sentence of Mishkin's brief for the University of California in Bakke frames the
issue precisely: "The outcome of this controversy will decide for future decades whether blacks,
Chicanos and other insular minorities are to have meaningful access to higher education and real
opportunities to enter the learned professions, or are to be penalized indefinitely by the disadvantages
flowing from previous pervasive discrimination." University of California Brief in Bakke, at * 13. In its
Summary of Argument, the University of California describes the historical growth of this remedial
perspective:
One of the things in which the nation may take great pride since the end of World War I1 has
been its willingness to address in actions, rather than simply words, the racial injustices that
are the unhappier parts of our legacy .... The commitment to relegate the lingering burdens
of the past to the past has run deeply and widely throughout the country, among a great many
of its institutions.
[T]oward the end of the last decade, many governmental and private institutions,
including this Court, came concurrently to the realization that a real effort to deal with many
of the facets of the legacy of past racial discrimination unavoidably requires remedies that are
attentive to race, that color is relevant today if it is to be irrelevant tomorrow. This discovery
and response was found in many sectors of society; the school desegregation area was a
major arena, but the same phenomenon was found in employment, housing, and many other
areas, including professional education.
Id. at *8-*10.
87. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13 (opinion of Powell, J.). In his brief Mishkin had in passing
proposed a similar argument sounding in diversity and academic freedom:
The relevant point is that the citizens of the state have chosen the University as the entity
with responsibility for grappling with the intractable problems of choosing the optimum mix
of students for the maximum benefit of education in the school, of contribution to the
profession, and ultimately to the society. Intrusive judicial review interferes drastically with
that process of democratic government. Such interference should be reserved for the
comparatively rare instances when circumstances compel it, and such circumstances are not
presented by this case. An effort by the judiciary, under the rubric of strict judicial scrutiny,
to fashion admissions standards is very likely to lead to the kinds of mistakes made by the
court below. In this instance, it would also gravely harm the healthy "federalism" now
presented by a system under which universities across the country are permitted to fashion
their own programs without any stultifying central controls.
University of California Brief in Bakke, at *76. See also id. at *76 n.74 (quoting Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (". . . It is the business of a
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Powell offered a special definition of diversity. He argued that within
the context of education, diversity did not imply "simple ethnic diversity,
in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed
to be members of selected ethnic groups, with the remaining percentage an
undifferentiated aggregation of students. The diversity that furthers a
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications
and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though
important element.,
88
Powell concluded that universities could create admissions criteria in
which "race or ethnic background" was a "'plus' in a particular applicant's
file," 89 but not admissions criteria in which race would "insulate the
individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available
seats." 90 The latter would deny each applicant their "right to individualized
consideration without regard to ... race." '' Powell was explicit that "[s]o
long as the university proceeds on an individualized, case-by-case basis,
university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation.
It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a university-to determine
for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
88. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
89. Id. at 317.
90. Id. Powell explained:
The file of a particular black applicant may be examined for his potential contribution to
diversity without the factor of race being decisive when compared, for example, with that of
an applicant identified as an Italian-American if the latter is thought to exhibit qualities more
likely to promote beneficial educational pluralism. Such qualities could include exceptional
personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity,
demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate
with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important. In short, an admissions program
operated in this way is flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light
of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for
consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight. Indeed, the weight
attributed to a particular quality may vary from year to year depending upon the "mix" both
of the student body and the applicants for the incoming class.
Id. at 317-18.
91. Id. at 318 n.52. Powell argued that a program that merely gives individuals a "plus" for their
race
treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions process. The applicant who loses out
on the last available seat to another candidate receiving a "plus" on the basis of ethnic
background will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because
he was not the right color or had the wrong surname. It would mean only that his combined
qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjective factors, did not outweigh those
of the other applicant. His qualifications would have been weighed fairly and competitively,
and he would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
It has been suggested that an admissions program which considers race only as one
factor is simply a subtle and more sophisticated-but no less effective-means of according
racial preference than the Davis program. A facial intent to discriminate, however, is evident
in petitioner's preference program and not denied in this case. No such facial infirmity exists
in an admissions program where race or ethnic background is simply one element-to be
weighed fairly against other elements-in the selection process.
Id. at 318 (footnote omitted).
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there is no warrant for judicial interference in the academic process. '92
Affirmative action programs would be protected even if a university, in
awarding applicants a "plus" based on their race, paid "some attention" to
the number of minority students they admitted.93 Because the affirmative
action program at the U.C. Davis Medical School did not purport to give
applicants individualized consideration, but instead explicitly set aside
sixteen slots dedicated to the admission of racial minorities, the program
created "the functional equivalent of a quota system. ' 94 For this reason,
Powell deemed the Davis program unconstitutional.
Although Mishkin lost on both major arguments he had advanced to
the Court, he understood almost at once that Powell's opinion in Bakke
"preserved" affirmative action programs in higher education, and that "this
outcome could be anticipated, and I think it was the outcome intended by
the Court. 9 5 The Court had not "giv[en] each party an equal half of the
loaf'; on the contrary, because most affirmative action programs did not
(or did not need to) use the features Justice Powell found fatal, Bakke's
primary effect, "by far, was to sustain race-conscious special admissions
programs throughout the nation." 96 Mishkin had lost the battle, but he had
won the war.
Yet Mishkin was troubled because he believed that Powell's opinion
rested on an obvious fallacy. Powell asserted that an affirmative action
program that awarded candidates merely a "plus" for race was "a facially
nondiscriminatory admissions policy, '97 so that "an applicant who loses
out on the last available seat to another candidate receiving a 'plus' on the
basis of ethnic background .... would have no basis to complain of
unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment." 98 But Mishkin
immediately realized that this assertion could not be true. How could "the
reasoning and 'principle' [it] contained ... be applied generally"? 99 If the
University of California, Berkeley were to decide that there were too many
Asian-American students on campus, so that to promote diversity it would
award each Asian-American applicant a "minus" in their application, it
could not be doubted that disadvantaged Asian-American applicants would
have a "basis" on which to claim that their rights under the Equal
92. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319 n.53.
93. Id. at 323.
94. /d. at 318.
95. Mishkin, supra note 78, at 58.
96. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 921-22.
97. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 (opinion of Powell, J.).
98. Id. The question of whether so-called "benign" racial classifications ought to count as racial
classifications was in fact hotly debated in the decades before Bakke. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality
Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1524-25 (2004).
99. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 925.
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Protection Clause had been violated, and it was plain that the Court, Justice
Powell included, would so declare.100
From the perspective of legal principle, the constitutionality of the
"plus" could be distinguished from the almost certain unconstitutionality of
the "minus" only on the ground that the "plus" was necessary to redress the
present effects of past discrimination. This is the argument that Mishkin
had advanced in his brief, but Powell in his opinion went out of his way to
repudiate it. Powell therefore wrote an opinion offering reasons that could
not apply to future cases. His opinion appeared to exemplify the kind of
"ad hoc evaluation"' 0' that Hart and Wechsler deplored as contrary to the
very life of the law. 0 2 The question that fascinated Mishkin was why
Powell had deliberately constructed an opinion that was "to the largest
degree a matter of form rather than substance."'
10 3
Mishkin used the antinomy between professional reason and popular
perception to construct his answer. At the time of Bakke, affirmative action
"was one of the most heated and polarized issues in the nation."' 1 4 Powell's
"proclamation of ambivalence"'' 0 5 was remarkable because it "both
symbolically and actually recognized the legitimacy of deeply held moral
claims on both sides."'' 0 6 It "expressed clear support for the view that racial
or ethnic lines are inherently constitutionally suspect,"'0 7  while
simultaneously declaring that affirmative action programs "might generally
continue."' 108 By genuinely reaching out to both sides of the controversy,
"[t]he Court took what was one of the most heated and polarized issues in
the nation, and by its handling defused much of that heat."' 09 It avoided the
"legislative backlash"'"10 that likely would have occurred had the Court
completely rejected "the claim advanced by Mr. Bakke and his
supporters,""' and yet it also provided a charter by which affirmative
action programs could continue to function in higher education. In
thematizing how Bakke could alter the terms of public debate by fashioning
a compromise moving between two poles of intense constitutional
100. Id.
101. Wechsler, supra note 5, at 12.
102. Cf Sandra Day O'Connor, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. REV.
395, 396 (1987) ("Indeed, at times, I think he may have been willing to sacrifice a little consistency in
legal theory in order to reach for justice in a particular case.").
103. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 926.
104. Id. at 929.
105. Id. at 917.
106. Id. at 922.
107. Id. at 923.
108. Id. at 922.
109. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 929. In light of subsequent disputes about Proposition 209 in
California and similar controversies elsewhere, it is questionable how much heat was actually defused,
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controversy, Mishkin anticipated the work of later constitutional theorists
who have sought to demonstrate how the Court has in the past intervened
in just this way to establish constitutional legitimacy in the midst of intense
constitutional controversy.
12
Most puzzlingly, Powell's opinion in Bakke struggled to construct a
constitutional rationale that would validate affirmative action programs
only if they deployed a complex, "destabilizing,"" 3 and largely fictional
system of "individualized consideration," even though it was apparent
upon inspection that such a system would produce virtually the same "net
operative results" as the explicit "set-aside" plan of U.C. Davis.' 1 4 Mishkin
explained this seemingly strange feature of Powell's opinion by suggesting
that "[t]he indirectness of the less explicitly numerical systems may have
significant advantages.., in terms of... the felt impact of their operation
over time."''
15
Even when the net operative results may be the same, the use of
euphemisms may serve valuable purposes; as do legal fictions, they
may facilitate the acceptance of needed measures....
Indirectness may also have significant advantages in muting
public reactions to, and possible resentment of, the granting of
112. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 98, at 1544-46; Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
1323 (2006).
113. Robert Post, Introduction: After Bakke, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 16-17 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998).
114. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 928. Mishkin was surely correct to observe that "in the vast
majority of cases" the "'plus'-type system.. . will inevitably work.., without significant difference
from the 'set-aside' format." Id. at 927 n.73. He explained why:
There is, after all, no objective way to compute the "edge" to be given to race or ethnic
background as compared to any other factor. If an admissions committee is allowed to give a
"plus" for race as a means of achieving diversity in the student body, the "plus" must be large
enough to make a difference in the outcome in some cases. But if that is so, isn't it clear that
the size of the "plus" will determine the number of minority students admitted? In those
circumstances, it is virtually inevitable that the authorities that determine the size of the
"plus" will set that size in terms of the number of minority students likely to be produced at
the level set. Since that is so, the use of a "plus" may simply be a slightly less precise, and
less direct, method of determining the proportion of minority students who will be given
preferential admission.
Id. at 926.
115. Id. at 928. Mishkin wrote:
The description of race as simply "another factor" among a lot of others considered in
seeking diversity tends to minimize the sense that minority students are separate and different
and the recipients of special dispensations; the use of more explicitly separate and structured
systems might have the opposite effect. These perceptions can have important consequences
for the schools and their students, both majority and minority. They can facilitate or hamper
the development of relationships among individuals and groups; they can advance or retard
the educational process for all-including, particularly, minority students whose self-image is
most crucially involved.
Id. Mishkin conceded that set-aside programs like the one at U.C. Davis are "most likely to re-arouse
and maintain awareness of distinctions based on race, thus having potential to retard achievement of the
objective of eliminating race-consciousness itself." Mishkin, supra note 78, at 59.
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preference on racial lines. The use of overt numbers, whether stated
as literal quotas or as "set-asides" for qualified applicants, greatly
tends to trigger the symbolism of the infamous "numerus clausus"
and other exclusionary devices of past invidious religious, ethnic,
and racial discrimination. The incorporation of such features in an
institutional admissions program continuing indefinitely from year
to year, tends continually to keep alive consciousness of the
program and the relevance of race therein; it tends to maintain and
exacerbate latent and overt hostility to these efforts to overcome
the effects of past racial discrimination. A program formulated
along the lines Justice Powell's opinion approves would, by the
very lack of "sharp edges," avoid such visibility in its operations
and tend to enhance the acceptability of the program.
1 6
This discussion of the symbolic and cultural effects of different forms
of affirmative action programs closely tracks Mishkin's earlier analysis of
the symbolic effects of the claimed judicial power to engage in prospective
lawmaking. Although the issue in Bakke concerned social attitudes toward
race, as distinct from the social perceptions of judicial legitimacy at issue
in Linkletter, Mishkin's treatment of the question was nevertheless
structurally analogous. His point was that differently designed affirmative
action programs with otherwise identical "net operative results" would
differentially affect preexisting social beliefs." 7
Mishkin's scrutiny of this issue is nothing short of brilliant. His
insight explains why, a quarter century later, the Court would
simultaneously uphold affirmative action programs for higher education
and constitutionally bar universities from revealing the precise extent of the
"plus" that they actually award on the basis of race." 18 It elucidates why in
dealing with questions involving the intersection of race and electoral
design the Court has explicitly concluded that "appearances do matter."' 19
116. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 927-28 (footnote omitted).
117. Accord John C. Jeffries, Jr., Bakke Revisited, 55 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 20 (2003) ("The burying
of racial preferences in 'plus' factors for certain individuals obscures and softens the sense of injury
that even the most dedicated proponents of affirmative action must acknowledge will be felt by those
who are disadvantaged for reasons they cannot control.").
118. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), with Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003). For a discussion, see Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning
the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 68-76 (2003).
119. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993). The tension between the appearance and the
reality of the law was a topic that was much discussed in the two decades after Brown. See, e.g., John
Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Inequality for the Negro-The Problem of Special
Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 363 (1966):
We are constantly forced to compromise the strong moral claims of the Negro, because the
structure of the institutions of our society interfere[s] with the implementation of what
otherwise might appear to be a just result. Moreover, the necessity of considering not only the
reality of governmental action, but also its appearance, may justify the belief that in this area
we cannot afford complete openness and frankness on the part of the legislature, executive or
judiciary. Though this may shock some, it perhaps is an inevitable consequence of our
[Vol. 95:1473
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It anticipates the work of a later generation of scholars who interpret the
Court's equal protection decisions as driven by the necessity of shaping
interventions to an expressive form that will allay "the fear of racial
'balkanization"",120 while simultaneously sustaining the constitutionality of
legislative redress for the present effects of past discrimination.'
2
'
Mishkin demonstrated that the eccentric and slippery logic of
Powell's distinction between constitutional and unconstitutional
affirmative action programs played an important role in Powell's effort to
achieve "a wise and politic resolution of an exceedingly difficult
problem." 122 It allowed Justice Powell "to equate race with other variables"
that "do not carry the same emotional freight as racial or ethnic lines. ' '2 3 In
the end Mishkin recognized that Powell had imposed constitutional
requirements on affirmative action programs that would significantly
diminish their potential to "exacerbate latent and overt" racial
"hostility."'
124
In many dimensions, therefore, Powell's opinion represented "a
major, successful accomplishment." 25 Yet Mishkin was not satisfied. On
the contrary, he asked, "if I cannot find an analytically sound principle to
support [the] result, what justification do I have to support such action by
the Supreme Court?"'2 6 The question led Mishkin to conclude his analysis
with a heartfelt cri du coeur:
history. One should not expect to find within what would be our traditional morality a just
cure for three hundred years of immorality.
Id. at 410.
120. Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 691
(1998).
121. See Post, supra note 118, at 74-76; see also Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative
Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195, 1236 (2002) ("The Court prefers that, when states
consider race, their actions are ambiguous enough to be explained in other ways."); Issacharoff, supra
note 120, at 693 ("[W]here the racial considerations in student selection and assignment are too central,
too visible, and too at odds with longstanding community practices, they are almost certain to fail.");
Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring. Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting
Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1601 (2002); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi,
Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts " and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506-07 (1993).
122. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 929.
123. Id. at 924.
124. Id. at 928.
125. Id. at 930. "I take the view that special admissions programs advance the cause of racial
equality in this country. Without them, the channels of upward mobility for racial minorities would
remain constricted; the nation's medical schools, top law schools, and status professions generally
would remain virtually all-white. The resolution of the 'American Dilemma' would be retarded, in the
present and for the future. The Bakke decision preserved those programs." Mishkin, supra note 78, at
57.
126. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 930. See Jeffries, supra note 117, at 2 ("And throughout, his
argument seemed devoid of any broad consistency that might be called principle .... Considered purely
as a matter of craft--of consistency with precedent, coherency as doctrine, and clarity of result-
Powell's Bakke opinion must be judged a failure.").
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I am not so absolute or so unworldly as to say that results may not
at times be a sufficient justification .... That is in one sense an
essential element in successful government. But it is at the same
time an exceedingly dangerous one. Unless cabined, it is an
argument that will always justify desired social outcomes
regardless of principled justifications.
But how could it be cabined here? I cannot assert that I
believe the safety of the United States depended on one outcome or
the other in Bakke. I can say that the case was an extraordinary one,
in terms of public awareness and concern as well as in terms of the
importance and difficulty of the issues. But such "extraordinary"
cases are not so uncommon on the dockets of the United States
Supreme Court, and the line between them and the run of other
cases is by no means easily demarcated or maintained. It is true
that in Bakke racial relations were importantly under stress. It is
also true that race relations are our most durable domestic crisis. Is
it therefore sufficient to limit the "exception" to racial matters? Is it
justifiable?
... I have tried but I have not been able to come to resolution.
That may be an unorthodox way to conclude a formal lecture. But
that is how I must, and do, conclude this one.
127
Even more acutely than in his earlier discussion of United States v.
Nixon, which he explicitly invoked, 2 8 Mishkin ended his Bakke lecture on
a note of solemn uncertainty in the face of unspeakable indeterminacy. He
affirmed the importance of maintaining the integrity of professional reason,
and he also affirmed that the social consequences of court decisions in
particular cases could outweigh a single-minded pursuit of that integrity.
Because there was no meta-principle to determine which objective a court
should pursue, Mishkin evidently regarded these two affirmations as
incompatible. His professed attitude toward Bakke was therefore one of
unresolved ambivalence. Unqualified praise for Powell's choice to achieve
an optimal social outcome at the sacrifice of "principled justifications"
would contribute to the self-fulfilling prophecy of legal realism and would
encourage courts to disregard the principles that in Mishkin's view
constituted the spine of the law. 2 9 Yet rigid fidelity to principle, regardless
of consequences, would risk intolerable social costs, ranging from the
delegitimation of the Court to catastrophic racial tension.' 30 Viewing this
127. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 930-31.
128. Id. at 931 n.82.
129. In 1954 Mishkin had scored "commentaries on the work of the Court" for carrying "an
oversimplified 'realist' flavor" and suggesting that "decisions were in fact exclusively the product of
each individual's politics and sympathies." Mishkin, supra note 27, at 682. Such commentary, he
argued, "helped to bring about a judiciary much closer to" the portrait presented by legal realism. Id.
130. Mishkin wrote that rejecting all use of race "would have produced a disastrous setback in
race and other relations in our society." Mishkin, supra note 28, at 929 n.78. Two decades later, John
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tension as unresolvable, and perhaps concluding that further scholarly
attention could only make matters worse, Mishkin assumed a disciplined
and stoic silence.
V
THE TENSION BETWEEN PROFESSIONAL REASON AND POPULAR
LEGITIMACY: A WEAK FORM OF THE DILEMMA
Underlying this silence was the sharp antinomy that Mishkin
postulated between professional reason and public perception. In his
discussion of Nixon, Mishkin saw that because the legitimacy of the Court
depends upon public perception, and because public perception follows the
logic of symbolism rather than professional reason, the very legitimacy of
the Court could depend upon its acting in ways that were inconsistent with
professional reason. Mishkin expanded this insight in his evaluation of
Bakke. He saw that the capacity of law to achieve socially desirable
outcomes could depend upon its following a logic of symbolism rather than
professional reason. But because Mishkin also questioned whether the
Court could "be justified in acting" unless it was able to advance "a
principled basis which would support acceptance" of its decision,131 he
faced a seemingly insoluble dilemma.
This dilemma can assume two distinct forms-a weak and a strong
form. The weak form of the dilemma arises whenever courts are tempted to
decide cases in ways that are responsive to the logic of popular values
rather than to norms of professional practice like reason-giving or applying
previously articulated reasons. The strong form of the dilemma arises
whenever courts are tempted to adopt the logic of popular values in a
manner that affirmatively contradicts or undermines norms of professional
practice. In this section, we argue that the weak form of the dilemma
should not, when properly conceived, be viewed as a dilemma; it merely
illustrates that norms of professional craft are not autonomous, but are
constantly and properly in dialogue with popular beliefs. In the section that
follows, we argue that although the strong form of the dilemma can
sometimes force courts to confront genuinely difficult choices, it does not
so much reflect an antimony between professional reason and popular
beliefs as it illustrates unresolved tensions concerning the purposes of law
itself.
The weak form of the dilemma assumes that adjudicative law, qua
law, requires the articulation of reason and principle, so that court
decisions that do not justify their judgments by reasons are not properly
Jeffries would record similar views, Jeffries, supra note 117, at 6-7, though it was easier for him openly
to approve Powell's "sacrifice of cogency for wisdom." Id. at 21.
131. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 909.
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legal. 132 This assumption, however, is questionable. No less a jurist than
Oliver Wendell Holmes once famously remarked that
[i]t is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and
determines the principle afterwards.... [L]awyers, like other men,
frequently see well enough how they ought to decide on a given
state of facts without being very clear as to the ratio decidendi. In
cases of first impression Lord Mansfield's often-quoted advice to
the business man who was suddenly appointed judge, that he
should state his conclusions and not give his reasons, as his
judgment would probably be right and the reasons certainly wrong,
is not without its application to more educated courts.
133
If it can intelligibly be said that a decision is "right" although its reasons
are "wrong," then it is at a minimum intelligible to say that a decision can
be justified even though its author has neither the wits nor the will to
articulate the principle for which it stands. And if judges commonly and
properly make decisions without being aware of the principles for which
they stand, then not only does the professional practice of judging go
beyond mere reason-giving, but the law itself must perform functions that
do not require reason-giving. 34 Holmes and Mansfield suggest that a
judge's most fundamental responsibility is to get a decision right, rather
than to decide it according to principles.
Whether a decision can be "right" even though it cannot be justified
by an articulable principle depends upon the purposes of law. A decision
can be "right" if it satisfies a proper purpose of the law, so long as that
purpose can be fulfilled without the necessity of articulating a principle.
Mishkin hints at such a purpose in his Foreword when he suggests that a
fundamental object of law is to give expression to the "particular clear
implications of values so generally shared in the society that the process
might well be characterized as declaring a preexisting law."' 35 In this
passage, Mishkin does not conceive popular beliefs as an intrinsically
irrational universe of symbols, but instead as a meaningful world of social
values.
It is very frequently said that a major purpose of law is to lend official
state sanction to "the felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and
political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious."'
136
This conception of law has been common at least since the work of
132. For a recent forceful statement of this view, see Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question
Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1478 (2005).
133. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 1
(1870).
134. Cf Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 659 (1995) ("[W]hen
context, case-by-case decisionmaking, and flexibility are thought important, the benefits of requiring
decisionmakers to give reasons do not come without a price.")
135. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 60 (footnote omitted). See supra text accompanying note 74.
136. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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Friedrich Karl von Savigny. 37 Sometimes social values take the form of
standards, with "contextual"' 138 meanings that can fully be known only in
their application. Sometimes, however, they take the form of intuitive
"concrete understandings"'' 39 that do not rise even to the level of
generalizations, much less rules. Holmes and Mansfield acknowledge that
judges can properly decide cases based on just such inarticulable intuitions.
They apparently believe that this is necessary for law to serve its function
of enforcing social values. 1
40
Of course it is unusual for law to integrate social values in the form of
such inarticulable intuitions. Far more frequently courts enforce social
values by transforming them into legal standards-like privacy or
offensiveness-which routinely count as legal reasons or principles.
Because the exact meaning of a standard is indeterminate until the
circumstances of its concrete application, a standard always incorporates
considerations that cannot be fully articulated or made explicit. These
considerations come from outside the law, so that law which uses standards
necessarily renders itself permeable to the influence of implicit social
norms. 14 1 Standards are thus always situated at the nexus of professional
reason and popular beliefs.
This silent incorporation of implicit social values does not undermine
the capacity of standards, or even necessarily of inarticulate intuitions, to
fulfill rule-of-law values like consistency, predictability, stability, reliance,
and transparency. Although compliance with explicit principles is one way
of realizing these values, so also is compliance with widely shared social
norms. 142 Certainly the common law operates on this premise when it
137. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR
LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE 27 (Abraham Hayward trans., Amo Press 1975) (1831). Savigny
stresses the "organic connection of law with the being and character" of a people, so that law "is
subject to the same movement and development as every other popular tendency." Id. For a modem
version of this position, see PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 10 (1965).
138. Philip Selznick, Foundations of Communitarian Liberalism, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, 16,
21 (Fall 1994).
139. PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF
COMMUNITY 323 (1992).
140. This function of law is captured by Paul Bohannan's notion of "double
institutionalization," by which he meant that law must reinstitutionalize general social norms. See Paul
Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 33, 35-36 (1965). Cf Schauer,
supra note 134, at 650 ("The argument for the nonexistence of commitment to reasons in legal practice
likely stems from a common law tradition of particularity. Law is not about generality, the tradition
holds, but about particular situations and decisions in cases that the infinite variety of human
experience ensures will never repeat themselves.").
141. For a discussion, see Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and
Social Orders, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 491, 494-98 (1994).
142. See Neil S. Siegel, A Prescription for Perilous Times, 93 GEO. L.J. 1645, 1666 (2005)
(reviewing GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WAR TIME FROM THE SEDITION
ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004)) ("[Cllear rules [are] insufficient. We also require a
strong sense of what counts as the relevant category-for example, what conduct our legal culture
signifies by use of the term 'torture.' That meaning must be so deeply shared that it resolutely resists
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expects persons to have the capacity to guide their behavior on the basis of
indeterminate standards like "reasonableness,"14 3 whose meaning derives
from innumerable implicit considerations. Many legal standards of conduct
seek to guide behavior in this way, 144 and in some contexts standards may
be more effective at achieving rule-of-law values than explicit legal
rules. 145 The latter may be opaque to persons who do not possess the
expertise of legal professionals.
It follows that judges who justify their decisions by reference to
contextual and shared social values may more effectively subject
themselves to the discipline of popular scrutiny than judges who justify
their decisions by reference to the dictates of technical professional reason.
Because the public may be unable to ascertain whether judges are in fact
applying professional reasons articulated in past decisions, but are able to
ascertain whether judges are accurately applying social values, the
incorporation of contextual and shared social values into the law may
advance the goal of disciplining judges to the virtue of consistency. It may
also more immediately and powerfully justify state coercion than appeals
to professional reason and principle. 1
46
This suggests that the weak form of the dilemma postulated by
Mishkin may be no dilemma at all. If the notion that adjudicative law
should act according to reasons and principles means that judges should act
only on the basis of reasons and principles that are explicit and
determinate, the requirement is false to actual practice and unnecessary to
the fulfillment of rule-of-law values and the justification of state coercion.
If, on the other hand, the requirement that adjudicative law should act
according to reasons and principles means that judges should act only on
the basis of reasons and principles that derive from the logic of
professional practice, as distinct from the logic of general social values, the
requirement is also false to actual practice and unnecessary to the
collapse into underlying rationales or hijacking for extrinsic rationalizations. The repressive forces
Professor Stone means to control are so powerful and pernicious precisely because they tend to
undermine that shared sense of meaning." (footnote omitted)).
143. See Post, supra note 141, at 499-503.
144. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957 (1989).
145. As one of us has written:
Nor is it self-evident as a general matter (the conventional wisdom notwithstanding) that
rules constrain behavior more than standards. Rules, which lack the chilling effect imposed
by standards, may free individuals to pursue counter-purposive advantage right up to the line
demarcated by the rule. Further, rules often leave gaps or generate conflicts, rendering
mechanical application difficult or impossible; ostensibly vague standards, by contrast, may
resonate with the constraining effect of social norms. As it becomes increasingly apparent
that rules generate unfair results that turn on technicalities, moreover, the pressure on
regulators and the regulated to circumvent a rule-bound regime will increase. A clear rule
constrains less insofar as judges become less prepared to enforce it.
Siegel, supra note 142, at 1664-65 (footnotes omitted).
146. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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fulfillment of rule-of-law virtues and the justification of state coercion. The
first interpretation of the demand for principled adjudication stresses the
need for law to be transparently explicit and determinate; the second
emphasizes the need for law to separate itself from politics. While
transparency and professionalism are no doubt important values in the law,
it is simply fantasy to imagine that law can be fully determinate or fully
autonomous from popular beliefs.
It is especially important to resist the lure of this fantasy in the context
of constitutional law. The authority of the Constitution flows not only from
its status as law, but also from its status as the repository of our
"fundamental nature as a people," which "is sacred and demands our
respectful acknowledgement." 147 When Woodrow Wilson argued that "the
Constitution of the United States is not a mere lawyers' document: it is a
vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the spirit of the age,"' 48 his point was
that the Constitution must be understood as an expression of the deepest
values of the nation. The Constitution has always veered between a
document owned and articulated by professional lawyers, 49 and, in
Franklin Roosevelt's words, a "layman's charter" owned and articulated by
the People themselves.1 50  As a charter of national governance, the
Constitution has always outrun the narrow confines of professional legal
reason. 151
Constitutional law shares this instability, vibrating constantly between
the professional logic of reason and principle and the intuitive, implicit,
and contextual logic of fundamental social values. This is evident
throughout the Court's decisions, whether one looks at the instability of
legal concepts like "classifications based upon race,"' 152  or the
147. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 167-69 (1987).
148. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 69 (1908).
149. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 46
(1997) ("[I]nterpretation of the Constitution ... is... essentially lawyers' work-requiring a close
examination of text, history of the text, traditional understanding of the text, judicial precedent, and so
forth."). According to Justice Scalia, only "principle and logic" should determine "the decisions of this
Court." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is thus unsurprising that
Scalia lambasted Powell's opinion in Bakke for being "thoroughly unconvincing as an honest, hard-
minded, reasoned analysis of an important provision of the Constitution." Antonin Scalia, The Disease
as Cure: "In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race," 1979 WASH. U. L.Q.
147, 148.
150. The Constitution of the United States Was a Layman's Document, Not a Lawyer's Contract
(Sept. 17, 1937), in 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 359, 367
(Samuel 1. Rosenman ed., 1941). See id. at 353: "[F]or one hundred and fifty years we have had an
unending struggle between those who would preserve this original broad concept of the Constitution as
a layman's instrument of government and those who would shrivel the Constitution into a lawyer's
contract."
151. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003).
152. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights
Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 14-28 (2003).
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determination in federalism doctrine of whether an activity is a "traditional
subject of state concern, 1 53 or the determination in First Amendment
jurisprudence of whether expression should be regarded as a "matter of
public concern"154 or classified as "commercial speech.1 55 Every Court
decision that "balances" or "weighs" incommensurate and potentially
incompatible values depends upon contextual interpretations that are
deeply influenced by implicit and inarticulate considerations characteristic
of social values.156 If such decisions are proper-and they are pervasive in
the life of our constitutional law-it is because constitutional law draws
authority from its expression of popular ideals. 57
This implies that the Court, as the oracle of the Constitution, must
always be caught between the demand to interpret the Constitution on
behalf of the professional legal reason exemplified by "first-rate
lawyers,"1 58 and the need to interpret the Constitution so as to "speak
before all others" about the nation's "constitutional ideals."' 59 This tension
has characterized constitutional law almost since the beginning of the
Republic. The Court has always been torn between defining its audience as
153. See Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59
VAND. L. REV. 1629 (2006); Neil S. Siegel, Dole's Future: A Strategic Analysis, 16 SuP. CT. EcoN.
REV. (forthcoming 2008).
154. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 679-82 (1990).
155. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 17-
18(2000).
156. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943 (1987).
157. Lower court decisions in the Court's most recent encounter with race-conscious state
action are quite explicit about the constitutional pertinence of these ideals to questions of equal
protection jurisprudence. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,426 F.3d
1162, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring in result) ("Schoolmates often become
friends, rivals and romantic partners; learning to deal with individuals of different races in these various
capacities cannot help but foster the live-and-let-live spirit that is the essence of the American
experience."), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908); McFarland v. Jefferson
County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 852 (W.D. Ky. 2004) ("Integrated schools, better academic
performance, appreciation for our diverse heritage and stronger, more competitive public schools are
consistent with central values and themes of American culture. Access to equal and integrated schools
has been an important national ethic ever since Brown v. Board of Education established what Richard
Kluger described as 'nothing short of a reconsecration of American ideals.' What Kluger and others
have articulated is that Brown's symbolic, moral and now historic significance may now far exceed its
strictly legal importance.... Brown's original moral and constitutional declaration has survived to
become a mainstream value of American education and.., the [School] Board's interests are entirely
consistent with these traditional American values. They reinforce our intuitive sense that education is
about a lot more than just the 'three-R's."' (referencing RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 710
(1975))), affid, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-915). For analysis of some of the equal protection issues
implicated in these cases, see generally Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment
Plans: Balkanization, Integration, and Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781 (2006).
158. Hart, supra note 3, at 101.
159. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.. 833, 868 (1992).
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the community of professional lawyers, and defining its audience as the
general American public. In this tension lies the strength and legitimacy of
our constitutional law. Much would be lost were the Court to abandon that
tension in a quixotic quest for an adjudicatory process fashioned solely
from the stuff of autonomous, explicit, professional reason.
60
VI
THE TENSION BETWEEN PROFESSIONAL REASON AND POPULAR
LEGITIMACY: A STRONG FORM OF THE DILEMMA
The strong form of the dilemma identified by Mishkin can not be so
satisfactorily resolved. It arises whenever courts are tempted to decide
cases in a manner that affirmatively contradicts or undermines the norms of
professional reason. Mishkin argues that a strong dilemma arose in Bakke
because the Court could achieve the value of reducing social tension over
affirmative action only if it could assert that affirmative action programs
awarding every applicant "individualized consideration" did not employ
facial racial distinctions, which was false.
It is helpful to ask at the outset why such a strong dilemma arises at
all. Assuming that reducing tension over affirmative action is a proper
constitutional value, why could not the Court in Bakke simply have
announced that it was distinguishing among affirmative action programs in
a manner designed to achieve that value, and so entirely have avoided any
strong dilemma? The Court could have said, for example, that for
constitutional purposes the difference in appearance between affirmative
action programs that give individualized consideration and affirmative
action programs that perpetuate quotas is constitutionally significant
because the latter contribute far more substantially to racial balkanization
and are consequently more controversial. 161 Of course the plausibility of
this principle would depend upon its underlying empirics, but the essential
point is that there is nothing about this principle that would contradict
professional norms. Hence this justification for the Bakke opinion would
not have created a strong dilemma. Why, by contrast, was it thought
necessary to announce a false legal principle in the context of the claim
that affirmative action programs awarding every applicant "individualized
160. For a discussion, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from
the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003). Cf Jeffries, supra
note 117, at 23 ("[lI]t is startling to note how little either the insight or the impact of Powell's opinion in
Bakke depended on his abilities as a lawyer.... [H]is achievement in Bakke came despite, not because
of, the constraints of legal reasoning.").
161. In the context of affirmative action in government contracting, for example, the Court has
explicitly crafted constitutional principles that distinguish among programs on the basis of their
capacity to achieve "[t]he dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to
personal opportunity and achievement." City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-06
(1989).
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consideration" did not employ facial racial distinctions? The answer
illuminates an essential but neglected function of our legal system, a
function that Mishkin's focus on the logic of popular symbolism invites us
to theorize.
This function is clarified by J.L. Austin's insight about the different
functions of speech. 162 Speaking performs a locutionary act, which is to say
that it "utter[s] a sentence that has a particular meaning."1 63 Speaking also
performs an illocutionary act, which is to say that in asserting a particular
meaning it enacts a particular kind of action, like promising, marrying,
deciding, etc. And speaking performs a perlocutionary act, which is to say
that it causes contingent effects in the world. Austin observes that the
"perlocutionary" force of speech turns on "what we bring about or achieve
by saying something, such as convincing, persuading, [or] deterring."'164
The locutionary aspect of speech is what makes it intelligible, the
illocutionary aspect is what it accomplishes in being spoken, and
the perlocutionary aspect is what it accomplishes by being spoken.
Note that because these are all aspects of speech rather than
categories of speech, the same utterance can have all three
dimensions. Thus the locutionary aspect of "I promise" makes the
promise intelligible as a promise; the illocutionary aspect produces
the promise itself; and the perlocutionary aspect produces effects in
the listener, such as reassurance or trust. 
1 65
When legal process jurisprudence celebrates the need for principles, it
conceives principles as having illocutionary force. The principles
announced by a judicial opinion have legal force merely by virtue of the
fact that they have been articulated as reasons for judicial action. If the
Court in Bakke were explicitly to state that the constitutionality of
affirmative action programs depended upon the extent to which they
contribute to racial balkanization, the statement would possess the
illocutionary force of a new principle of constitutional law.1 66 There would
be no strong dilemma.
Notice, however, that the illocutionary force of such a legal principle
can not by itself reduce tension over affirmative action. The question of
whether the words of a court opinion have any particular empirical effect
depends upon their perlocutionary force. The perlocutionary force of a
court opinion is a matter of contingent causality that very much depends
upon exactly how a court speaks (among other things). 67 Were the Court
162. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS 95-109 (2d ed. 1999).
163. Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 293, 295 (1993).
164. Austin, supra note 162, at 109.
165. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, Ill YALE L.J. 769, 869 n.554 (2002) (citation omitted).
166. For development of this point, see Siegel, supra note 157.
167. It is not necessary to assume that the public carefully parses Supreme Court opinions. It is
necessary to assume only that the content of the Court's speech is relevant to the perlocutionary effect
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explicitly to announce that it was classifying affirmative action programs
with an eye to reducing tension over affirmative action, the Court's very
announcement might significantly affect whether its decision could achieve
its desired impact: It is at least as likely that the announcement would
undermine the intended perlocutionary effect of the opinion as enhance
it. 168
Mishkin interpreted Bakke as written for the purpose of achieving the
perlocutionary goal of reducing social controversy over affirmative action.
He believed that this goal could be attained only if the Court's opinion
"both symbolically and actually recognized the legitimacy of deeply held
moral claims on both sides."'169 To acknowledge the moral claims of those
urging color blindness, it was necessary to assert that all state programs
based upon race would be constitutionally disfavored and subject to strict
scrutiny. Actually to apply this principle, however, would undermine all
affirmative action programs. To sustain the moral claims of those who saw
affirmative action as necessary to overcome centuries of discrimination,
Powell (in Mishkin's view) believed it necessary to assert that affirmative
action programs giving applicants "individualized consideration" were not
based upon race. Because this latter assertion could not be squared with the
dictates of professional reason, a strong dilemma arose. 170
Mishkin thus argued that the strong dilemma in Powell's Bakke
opinion came about because the only way the Court could achieve its
desired perlocutionary effect of reducing tension over affirmative action
was to assert illocutionary meanings that were inconsistent with
professional principles.'17 This suggests that strong dilemmas arise when
the Court seeks to fulfill a social value by creating a perlocutionary effect
of its holding. We acknowledge that the meaning of Court opinions is conveyed to the public in
complex, highly mediated ways.
168. This is why Mishkin, while "recogniz[ing] that wise and effective government may at
times require such indirection and less-than-full candor," did not see how one could "proceed by
proclaiming in a Supreme Court opinion that this is what is happening." Mishkin, supra note 28, at 928.
In other contexts, however, the explicit announcement of a perlocutionary objective might not have a
self-undermining effect. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995);
Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
169. Mishkin, supra note 28, at 922.
170. A quarter century later, Justice O'Connor sought to resolve this same strong dilemma in a
different way. Like Powell, she wished to authorize institutions of higher education to engage in
affirmative action. But, in contrast to Powell, she was willing to acknowledge that such programs were
based upon race. She nevertheless sought to vindicate and protect these programs by applying the test
of strict scrutiny in a manner that was so deferential as to be inconsistent with the generally accepted
meaning of the test. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Post, supra note 118, at 57-58 and
n.257.
171. From the perspective of perlocutionary effect, the general public was for Mishkin merely
the object of the Court's benevolent manipulation. He did not seem concerned that manipulation in law
could corrode the integrity of the Court's conversations with the country. See supra note 69. This was
perhaps because he did not perceive much value in the Court's attempting to converse with a public
whose symbolic commitments were largely impervious to rational persuasion.
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attainable only by illocutionary meanings that contradict professional
reason.'72 This is exactly the structure of the strong dilemma that Mishkin
identified in his analysis of United States v. Nixon. He argued that the
Court in Nixon sought to achieve the perlocutionary effect of maintaining
its own legitimacy, which the Court believed could be accomplished only
by illocutionary meanings that were inconsistent with defensible principles
of separation of powers. 173 Because the Court's legitimacy is an
empirically contingent fact, it can not simply be decreed though the
illocutionary force of the Court's principles; it must be causally produced
through the impact of the Court's words.
Mishkin's concern with strong dilemmas, in other words, evidences
his focus on the potential tension between perlocutionary effect and
illocutionary force. This focus is immensely illuminating. Many modem
theorists seek to understand the dialogue provoked by the opinions of the
Court; they conceive the relationship between the Court and the public as a
matter of rational conversation. 74 Mishkin, by contrast, invites us to
imagine the full perlocutionary force of the Court's decisions, which goes
far beyond their rational content. 75 He is concerned with how the structure
and language of Court decisions affect public opinion. Modern scholars
might explore this question with the tools of anthropology, cultural theory,
or economics. Although Mishkin used a relatively unsophisticated
methodology that emphasized irrational symbolism, the question he invites
us to analyze is essential to the legitimation of the legal system.
Most precisely formulated, Mishkin's work focuses our attention on
dilemmas that arise when the Court seeks to attain a perlocutionary impact
that can be achieved only through the articulation of illocutionary
meanings that are inconsistent with the dictates of professional reason.
Strong dilemmas have bite because, despite claims to the contrary, 76
courts must pay attention to the perlocutionary effects of their opinions.
This is because the legal system exists to serve purposes for society at
large-"to regulate behavior and to maintain social cohesion as
172. Cf Jeffries, supra note 117, at 25 ("Sometimes, there is indeed a wide gulf between legal
reasoning and political wisdom. Sometimes, the gap between the conventional criteria of
judging... and a politically far-sighted decision is unbridgeably large. Where that is true, there is no
easy melding of legal craft and political insight. The judge must choose between them." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
173. See supra Part I1.
174. See infra note 200.
175. For a contemporary example of scholarly analysis of perlocutionary effects, see Tobias
Barrington Wolff, Political Representation and Accountability Under Don't Ask, Don 't Tell, 89 IOWA
L. REV. 1633, 1658-59 (2004).
176. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 920 (2004) (memorandum of Scalia,
J.) ("To expect judges to take account of political consequences-and to assess the high or low degree
of them-is to ask judges to do precisely what they should not do.").
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circumstances change."'' 77 In order to accomplish these purposes, a court
must "anticipate[] the disputants'-or a community's-reactions to [its]
behaviour."' 78 The legitimation of the legal system, like the legitimation of
any government institution, "is constituted by its collective acceptance,"',
79
and this acceptance depends upon public perception.180 That perception, in
turn, is a result of the perlocutionary effect, rather than the illocutionary
force, of judicial opinions.' 8' This is all so clear that we might pose the
opposite inquiry: If the perlocutionary effects of an opinion are consistent
with, or required by, overarching goals of the legal system, why should it
matter whether the opinion is inconsistent with professional reason?
One possible answer is that the legitimacy of the legal system also
depends, as Mishkin observed in his Foreword, on the popular belief that
courts decide cases based upon law, which means based upon the logic of
professional reason. In his recent confirmation hearings Chief Justice John
Roberts masterfully appealed to this belief: "Judges are like umpires.
Umpires don't make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and
a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a
limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see an umpire.' 182 It is in
part because much of the public believes that judges are merely umpires
who apply preexisting principles that judicial decisions have legitimacy
177. Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, in MARTIN
SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION 63 (2002).
178. Id.
179. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 117 (1995). "Institutions
survive on acceptance." Id. at 118. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective
Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 307 (2003) ("Legitimacy is the property that a rule or an authority
has when others feel obligated to defer voluntarily."); Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of
International Obligation, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 300, 309 (1968) ("[W]hether a designated requirement is to
be regarded as obligatory will depend in part on whether those who have made that designation are
regarded by those to whom the requirement is addressed (the target audience) as endowed with the
requisite competence or authority for that role.").
180. Alexis de Tocqueville remarked that the "power" of Justices of the Supreme Court
is immense, but it is power springing from opinion. [Justices] are all-powerful so long as the
people consent to obey the law; they can do nothing when they scorn it. Now, of all powers,
that of opinion is the hardest to use, for it is impossible to say exactly where its limits come.
Often it is as dangerous to lag behind as to outstrip it.
The federal judges therefore must not only be good citizens and men of education and
integrity, qualities necessary for all magistrates, but must also be statesmen; they must know
how to understand the spirit of the age, to confront those obstacles that can be overcome, and
to steer out of the current when the tide threatens to carry them away, and with them the
sovereignty of the Union and obedience to its laws.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 150-51 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence Trans.,
1969).
181. See, e.g., SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 77
(1960) ("Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the
existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.").
182. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of Judge John
G. Roberts, Jr.).
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with litigants who lose as well as with litigants who win.' 83 On this view,
courts legitimate the legal system when they construct their opinions
according to the dictates of professional reason.
This is of course the central premise of legal process jurisprudence.
The basic idea is that faithful compliance with professional norms is in the
long run the best hope for legitimating the legal system. This idea is hotly
debated within the political science literature.184 But even if we accept its
basic thrust, as Mishkin plainly did, there is nevertheless much to be said
about it. We shall confine ourselves to two observations. First, the
assumption that compliance with professional norms legitimates courts in
the long run does not necessarily imply that courts ought to ignore the
perlocutionary force of particular decisions. Mishkin was drawn to the
contemplation of strong dilemmas because he recognized that desirable
perlocutionary impact might in particular cases outweigh the general effect
of routine adherence to principles of professional craft. He also believed,
however, that if breaches of professional norms were to become common
enough, the public might come to lose its ,trUSt,,181 that courts are indeed
impartial legal decision makers. 186 No single case would likely undermine
public confidence in norms of professional practice,' 87 but every publicly
apparent violation of such norms would increase the risk of public
disillusionment. 88 And, as Mishkin had observed early in his career,
183. For a theoretical account of this point, see Sweet, supra note 177.
184. See, e.g., TERRI J. PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 161-88 (1999) (arguing
that the legitimacy of the Supreme Court depends upon the results of its opinions, not upon its legal
reasoning).
185. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 204-08 (2002); Carla Hesse & Robert Post,
Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 20 (Carla Hesse
& Robert Post eds., 1999).
186. "Law depends for its existence on a reciprocity of expectations between the governed and
the governors, expectations that survive only when there is adherence to the rule of law." Martin P.
Golding, Transitional Regimes and the Rule of Law, 19 RATIO JURIs 387, 390 (1996).
187. For musing on the distrust of legality that a single decision can cause, see Robert Post,
Sustaining the Premise of Legality: Learning to Live with Bush v. Gore, in BUSH v. GORE: THE
QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002).
188. Martin Shapiro theorized this dilemma with perfect clarity:
If the Court is to be successful as a political actor, it must have the authority and public
acceptance which the principled, reasoned opinion brings.
... To put it bluntly, the real problem is how the Supreme Court can pursue its policy
goals without violating those popular and professional expectations of "neutrality" which are
an important factor in our legal tradition and a principal source of the Supreme Court's
prestige. It is in these terms, and not in terms of the philosophic, jurisprudential, or historical
correctness of the concept of neutral principles, that the debate should now proceed.
Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and Neutral
Principles, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587, 603, 605-06 (1963). Compare Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992):
The root of American governmental power is revealed most clearly in the instance of the
power conferred by the Constitution upon the Judiciary of the United States and specifically
upon this Court. As Americans of each succeeding generation are rightly told, the Court
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repudiating the constraints of professional standards in order to achieve
desirable perlocutionary effects would also contribute to a "self-fulfilling"
prophecy in which the constraints of professional norms would grow
inexorably weaker. 1
89
Legal process jurisprudence arose in order to defend law from the
charge that it was merely a mystified form of politics. It was born out of an
intense concern for the vulnerability of professional norms of craft, which
it conceived as perpetually at risk from the temptation to deform law by
demeaning it into a species of political action. 90 Mishkin had so deeply
internalized this concern that it left him literally speechless before what he
perceived to be the tragic choice of strong dilemmas. As he wrote at the
conclusion of his analysis of Nixon, he could approve the Court's focus on
the perlocutionary effects of its decision "only with tentativeness and
subject to reexamination with greater perspective," because he was
"sufficiently conscious of the dangers of simply concluding that short term
success is its own proof of right."' 9' At the end of his Bakke lecture, he did
not deem it appropriate to go even that far.
Strong dilemmas were unspeakable for Mishkin because they
threatened to undermine the professional norms that made possible the rule
of law. Mishkin was especially sensitive to the possibility of strong
dilemmas because, like many involved in legal process jurisprudence who
sought to repel the challenge of legal realism, he was concerned to stress
the determinate integrity of professional norms. 192 He therefore imagined
that violations of "good lawyership"'' 93 potentially caused by strong
dilemmas would be immediately obvious and demoralizing. Underlying
Mishkin's apprehension of the tragedy of strong dilemmas, in other words,
cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money and, except to a minor degree, it
cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees. The Court's power lies, rather, in its
legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance
of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and to declare what it
demands.
The underlying substance of this legitimacy is of course the warrant for the Court's
decisions in the Constitution and the lesser sources of legal principle on which the Court
draws. That substance is expressed in the Court's opinions,. and our contemporary
understanding is such that a decision without principled justification would be no judicial act
at all. But even when justification is furnished by apposite legal principle, something more is
required. Because not every conscientious claim of principled justification will be accepted as
such, the justification claimed must be beyond dispute. The Court must take care to speak and
act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them,
as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having,
as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the
Court's legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in
which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.
Id. at 865-66.
189. See generally Mishkin, supra note 27.
190. See supra note 11.
191. Mishkin, supra note 32, at 91.
192. See supra note 26.
193. Hart, supra note 3, at 100.
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lay a particular picture of the autonomy and thus the vulnerability of
professional principles.
The force of strong dilemmas might well change, however, if
professional norms were defined differently. Our second observation goes
to this point: The more that professional norms are conceptualized in ways
that are impervious to the achievement of perlocutionary goals and that
seem to require determinate outcomes, the more likely strong dilemmas are
to arise. Conversely, the more that professional norms are conceptualized
as supple and indeterminate, the more likely it is that the various
perlocutionary ends that courts might otherwise seek to achieve can be
rendered consistent with professional reason, and the less likely it is that
strong dilemmas will arise.
Professional reason ought to be framed so as to achieve the purposes
of the legal system. No doubt these purposes include the fair, just, and
efficient resolution of disputes. 194 But if, as we have argued in Part V, these
purposes also include the expression of fundamental social values, norms
of professional reason should also be defined so as to facilitate the capacity
of the legal order "to bring the public administration of justice into touch
with changed moral, social, or political conditions. '195 This dimension of
professional craft is what Brandeis 196 and Frankfurter 97 called judicial
"statesmanship."'' 98  Infusing craft norms with considerations of
statesmanship would not only enhance the law's ability to achieve the
important function of expressing social ideals, it would also reduce the
194. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997).
195. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
14 AM. LAW. 445, 445 (1906).
196. Melvin 1. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 299,
314.
197. Felix Frankfurter, The Court and Statesmanship, in LAW AND POLITICS 34 (Archibald
MacLeish & E.F. Prichard, Jr. eds., 1939). See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the
Frankfurterian Paradigm: Reflections on Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY
679, 702 (1999) (For Frankfurter the Court was "a forum for 'statesmanship'.... In that new role, the
Court had to recognize the nondeterminative nature of the Constitution's vague provisions, the wisdom
and propriety of deferring to legislative judgments, and the unavoidable need 'to gather meaning not
from reading the Constitution but from reading life."' (citation omitted)).
198. For de Tocqueville's views on judicial statesmanship, see supra note 180. Chief Justice
Taft agreed on this point. In a letter congratulating George Sutherland on his appointment to the
Supreme Court, Taft wrote:
I do not minimize at all the importance of having Judges of leaming in the law on the
Supreme Bench, but the functions performed by us are of such a peculiar character that
something in addition is much needed to round out a man for service upon that Bench, and
that is a sense of proportion derived from a knowledge of how Government is carried on, and
how higher politics are conducted in the State. A Supreme Judge must needs keep abreast of
the actual situation in the country so as to understand all the phases of important issues which
arise, with a view to the proper application of the Constitution, which is a political instrument
in a way, to new conditions.
Letter from William Howard Taft to George Sutherland (Sept. 10, 1922), microformed on William H.
Taft Papers, Reel 245 (Library of Cong., 1969).
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likelihood that achieving desirable perlocutionary effects would conflict
with principles of professional reason. This suggests that by stressing the
distinction between the professional logic of legal reason and the emotional
logic of cultural symbolism, Mishkin was actually conceptualizing
professional norms in ways that would enhance the likelihood of strong
dilemmas. How professional norms ought to be constructed ultimately
turns on the appropriate jurisprudential balance between fidelity to social
values and faithfulness to the autonomous requirements of professional
reason.
Contemporary scholars, taking their lead from Bickel,' 99 have not
tended to focus on the issue of strong dilemmas. This is not because such
dilemmas do not exist, but instead because contemporary scholars have
conceived professional reason as effectively in dialogue with public
values. 20 0 This dialogue renders strong dilemmas less likely to arise.
Mishkin's work reminds us, however, that this approach risks potential
danger. If professional norms are rendered too permeable to social values,
the autonomous integrity of legal reason may be diluted and compromised,
so that the practice of professional reason may in the public mind begin to
merge with the exercise of merely political power. A veteran of the battles
over legal realism, Mishkin might well regard contemporary scholarship as
foolishly complacent about this potential vulnerability of professional
reason. Yet it would be ironic indeed if Mishkin's efforts to shore up
professional craft by emphasizing its autonomy were to have the ultimate
effect of rendering legal reasoning more fragile, because more susceptible
to the recurring corrosion of strong dilemmas.
VII
MISHKIN AS A COLLEAGUE AND TEACHER: AN APPRECIATION
Mishkin's reserve about strong dilemmas has fortunately not extended
to his activities as a colleague and a teacher. In those capacities, he has
been an unending source of wisdom and insight.20 As a teacher, Mishkin
has pursued the antinomy of professional reason and popular belief.
199. See, e.g., BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 76, at 91
("Virtually all important decisions of the Supreme Court are the beginnings of conversations between
the Court and the people and their representatives.").
200. See, e.g., Post, supra note 118, at 107-12; Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review,
91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993). For a recent overview and assessment of such work, see Christine
Bateup, The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of Constitutional
Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1109 (2006).
201. See, e.g., Note, The Void-For- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67, 67 n.IA (1960) ("It would be dishonest or very naive not to recognize the heavy debt the
author owes to Professor Paul Mishkin. He cannot be charged with any of the ideas this Note contains,
nor can his reaction to them be anticipated. But the impression remains that so much of it as is
intellectually satisfying derives from perspectives-or from methods of developing perspectives-
which are held on loan from him.").
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Regardless of which side of the divide his students might select, Mishkin
has never allowed them to rest easy with their choice. He applied this
method to a range of subjects, from Chief Justice Marshall's performance
in Marbury v. Madison,20 2 to the passive-virtues debate, 20 3 to the Court's
controversial disposition of Naim v. Naim.2 °4
Mishkin characteristically impressed on his students and colleagues
the potentially acute tradeoff between legal principle and wise politics; the
normative power of the actual; 20 5 the subtle yet profound importance of
symbols and appearances, from columns to robes; 20 6 and the critical
distinction between dishonesty and less than full candor.20 7 The tough
antinomies that Mishkin identified in his writing unleashed magical
discussions for all of us lucky enough to know him well, discussions we
202. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
203. Compare BICKEL, supra note 30, at 111-98, with PAUL M. BATOR, PAUL J. MISHKIN,
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, & HERBERT WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 660-62 (2d ed. 1973), and Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues "
A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1964). See
supra note 77.
204. See 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (dismissing for want of a substantial federal question a challenge
to Virginia's antimiscegenation statute despite the statute's incompatibility with the equal protection
principles first articulated in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). See, e.g., Siegel, supra note
19, at 2017 ("Naim [did not] exemplify how the Court should go about its daily business. Rather, it
constituted a rare accommodation that principle made with pragmatism for the ultimate purpose of
vindicating Brown's promise. Principle lost the battle for a few more years, a significant-and perhaps
intolerable-cost, but at least principle put itself in a position not to lose the war." (footnotes omitted)).
When the legitimacy of Brown was more secure, the Court unanimously invalidated Virginia's
antimiscegenation statute as a violation of equal protection and due process. Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967).
205. During the litigation over Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Mishkin coauthored
an amicus brief on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union in which he argued that the rule
requiring certain procedural protections should be deemed prophylactically necessary. See Brief of the
American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae, Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 1966 WL 100516, at *21
("The Inherently Compelling Nature of Police Custodial Interrogation Requires That a Confession
Obtained During Such Interrogation Be Excluded Unless the State Shows That There Were Present
Adequate Devices to Protect the Subject's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination."). He did not believe
that the Court was prepared to hold that the Constitution required such warnings. Mishkin proved
correct, and the Court adopted his unusual rationale. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79 ("[W]e hold that
when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any
significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized.
Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege."); see also id. at 463 (noting "both the
dangers of interrogation and the appropriateness of prophylaxis stemming from the very fact of
interrogation itself'). Yet thirty-four years after Miranda changes on the ground in actual police
practices prepared the Court to decide in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), that
"Miranda is constitutionally based." Id. at 440. The change could be interpreted as illustrating what
Mishkin would call the normative power of the actual.
206. See, e.g., Mishkin, supra note 46, at 63 n.29 ("Though I know that judges are human and
quite distinct individuals, I am not in favor of their doffing their robes, for I think there is value in
stressing, for themselves and for others, the quite real striving for an impersonality I know can never be
fully achieved.").
207. The difference between using the Constitution as a shield and using it as a sword also
comes to mind. So does the distinction between finality and infallibility.
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will never forget. His students and his colleagues cannot help but read
high-profile, recent decisions-like those involving homosexuality 20 8 and
symbolic endorsements of religion 209-in light of the perennial tension
between the general obligation to conform to professional standards and
the perlocutionary effects of a singular opinion.
As a teacher and as a colleague, Mishkin has always been the master
of legal craft. He has implacably pursued the goal of legal excellence. A
consummate professional, he has given generously of his insight and
experience. To his students, Mishkin has continuously emphasized the kind
of mid-level theorizing characteristic of first-rate lawyers. He has proven a
hard taskmaster, with no affection for lazy or sentimental thinking. But
over the years he has been as demanding of himself as he has been of
others, and he has inspired fierce loyalty and affection.
Mishkin is particularly fond of the declaration of a Talmudic rabbi
who said: "And especially from my students did I learn!" The rabbi's
profession of gratitude struck Mishkin some time ago, and it has resonated
with him ever since. We, too, have a debt to declare. We count ourselves
very fortunate to have learned from Paul Mishkin in his role as a colleague,
teacher, and dear friend. His insight and his rigor have guided us, and his
scholarly humility has reminded us that at most we can aspire to form part
of an ongoing conversation about the nature of our indispensable and yet
ultimately mysterious Constitution. If we are lucky, we can at times have
interlocutors as deep, as challenging, and as far-seeing as Mishkin.
And especially from Paul have we learned.
208. In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the Court dramatically overruled Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), announcing a right of sexual privacy in the home that extends to
homosexuals. Yet the Court appeared ambivalent about whether the right sounded in liberty or equality,
see 539 U.S. at 575, avoided the language of fundamental rights or strict scrutiny, id. at 578, and
suggested that the issue of gay marriage was distinguishable without explaining why or how, id. If the
Court followed to its logical conclusion its defense of the dignity of intimate homosexual relationships
and the state's lack of authority to demean homosexuals, id. at 560, 567, 575, and 578, prohibitions of
gay marriage would almost certainly violate equal protection. Yet the Court explicitly avoided this
conclusion. Id. at 578.
209. In McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005), and Van Orden v. Perry,
545 U.S. 677 (2005), the Court held 5-4 that the McCreary County Ten Commandments display
violated the Establishment Clause but that the Van Orden monument did not. Only Justice Breyer was
in the majority in both cases, and his narrow concurrence in the judgment was decisive in Van Orden.
Breyer declared that he was acting explicitly to reduce the "divisiveness" that Ten Commandments
cases generate. 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). He sent a strong signal that
advocates of church-state separation should not challenge longstanding displays and that their
adversaries should not build new ones. Id. at 703-04.
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